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DENNIS LEVINE, AN EXCEPTION OR THE 
NORM: INSIDE TRADING AND FOREIGN BANK 
SECRECY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As national securities markets rapidly become international 
markets, 1 the idealized precept that federal securities laws are to 
create "a system providing equal access" to information for all in-
vestors, appears to faulter. 2 One cause of this breakdown is "in-
sider trading."3 Traditionally prosecuted under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,• illegal activities conducted through secret 
bank accounts outside U.S. borders and jurisdiction have posed a 
sobering challenge to prosecution of the inside trader.5 
Problems in prosecution arise due to concerns of extraterrito-
riality and the application of domestic laws to foreign conduct.6 
Foreign jurisdictions with bank secrecy laws may consider the dis-
closure of information concerning a bank account, including the 
identity of its holder, a criminal offense. 7 This allows inside traders 
1. Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, 1983: Hearings 
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigation of the Senate Comm. on Governmental 
Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1983) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of John M. 
Fedders, Director, Division of Enforcement SEC); Note, Secrecy and Blocking Laws, 18 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 809, 810 (1985). "It soon will be possible to trade many securities of 
U.S. corporations 24 hours a day as a result of improved international communications and 
the growth of securities markets in London, Paris, Zurich, Singapore, Hong Kong, Tokyo 
and other financial centers." Senate Hearing, supra, at 320. 
2. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that federal securities laws implemented 
the Congressional purpose of creating a system providing "equal access" to information nec-
essary for reasoned and intelligent investment decisions. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 
401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968). 
3. "Insider trading" is a term generally used to describe the act of purchasing or selling 
securities while in the possession of material non-public information (inside information) 
concerning an issuer of securities. Arkin, Trading on Inside Information: Problems of De-
fining, Detecting, Prosecuting, and Defending Insider Trading Cases, 270 PRACT. L. INST. 17 
(1984). The inside information must be "material" information, which is information that 
would likely be "viewed by a reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total 
mix' of information made available"; thus, important in deciding whether to buy, sell, or 
hold a company's securities. Id. (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 
449 (1976)). 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982); Note, Bank Secrecy and Inside Trading, 23 Vrn. J. INT'L L. 
605, 615 (1982-1983). 
5. Note, supra note 4, at 605-06. 
6. Note, Extraterritoriality: Current Policy of the United States, 12 SvR. J. INT'L L. & 
COM. 493 (1986). 
7. Note, supra note 4, at 605-06. A violation of banking secrecy is punishable under 
Article 47 of the Swiss Federal Law Relating to Banks and Savings Institutions of Nov. 8, 
1934, as amended by Federal Law of Mar. 11, 1971, and under the Swiss Penal Code, 
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to circumvent U.S. securities laws by conducting their investment 
transactions through these financial entities. 8 Foreign banks acting 
as intermediaries for their customers, provide a means for an ac-
count holder to enter into anonymous sales and purchases of 
stock. 9 The secrecy problem arises when the intermediary bank is 
asked to disclose information about an account, which it cannot do 
without being subject to liability under the secrecy laws of its 
home jurisdiction.10 Thus, neither the investor's identity nor infor-
mation concerning the investments is available to the Securities 
Exchange Commission(SEC).11 Generally, the SEC's only means of 
obtaining necessary information is through lengthy negotiations 
and litigation.12 
As billions and billions of illegal dollars escape this country, 13 
U.S. policy has centered around treaty confirmations with bank se-
crecy jurisdictions.14 Much of this negotiation has been concen-
trated in Europe and the Caribbean Islands where extensive se-
crecy jurisdictions exist.16 Treaties provide a mechanism to acquire 
information, but at times prove cumbersome in ensuring quick 
prosecution of the inside trader .16 
In Part II, this Note will examine the Dennis Levine case17 as 
a recent example of an inside trader's exploitation of U.S. securi-
ties laws. Part III looks at the general problem of extraterritorial-
ity and foreign bank secrecy. Part IV highlights the problem of 
bank secrecy in Switzerland and the compromise ultimately 
Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [STGB] art. 273. 
8. Note, supra note 1, at 812. 
9. Note, supra note 4, at 606. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 320. 
14. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means 
for Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading, 
Aug. 31, 1982, United States-Switzerland, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Mem-
orandum]. Also, three years of negotiations with Cayman Islands resulted in the formulation 
of a treaty. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1986, at DlO, col. 2. 
15. See DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX HAVEN INFORMATION BOOK 
(1982) [hereinafter TAX HAVEN INFORMATION BooK]. Some of the secrecy jurisdictions are: 
Antigua, Austria, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Is-
lands, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, the Channel Islands, Gibraltar, Grenada, Hong 
Kong, the Isle of Man, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Republic of Nauru, 
the Netherlands, the Netherland Antilles, Panama, Singapore, S. Kitts, St. Vincent, Swit-
zerland, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Id. at ii. 
16. See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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achieved in that situation. Part V will look at attempted solutions 
to the bank secrecy problem and recommend further possible ac-
tions to pierce secrecy jurisdictions. Part VI will conclude that the 
SEC should adopt a pretrading disclosure system similar to that 
presently used by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
II. THE DENNIS LEVINE CASE 
Recently, one of the largest inside trading cases ever was 
brought by the SEC.18 Dennis Levine, a former managing director 
of Drexel Burnham Lambert, pleaded guilty to criminal charges of 
tax evasion, securities fraud and perjury.19 The SEC alleged that 
Levine "illegally traded" in the securities of 54 companies between 
June 1980 and December 1985.20 Over the five and one-half year 
period, Levine accumulated $12.6 million in illegal profits.21 
Dennis Levine represents the classic insider who employs the 
use of foreign bank secrecy to hide his illegal profits.22 Levine had 
an elaborate scheme that involved fictitious names, phony Pana-
manian corporations, and a Bahamas based financial institution. 23 
Far from the exception, the Levine case was one of 35 inside trad-
ing cases the SEC had under investigation as of July 1986.24 
A unique and pervasive factor in the bevine case was the co-
operation of the Bahamian government. 25 The Bahamas has tradi-
tionally been a secrecy jurisdiction, but to aid in the investigation, 
18. Drexel Official Accused by SEC of Inside Trades, Wall St. J., May 13, 1986, at 3, 
col. 1. As was stated by SEC Enforcement Director Gary Lynch, "This is the largest insider 
trading case we've ever brought, not only in terms of profits but also the number of securi-
ties involved and the length of time over which the violations occurred." Id. at 22, col. 1; see 
infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
19. Henry, Circus Time: Wall Street Reels Over Scandal, TIME, June 23, 1986, at 61; 
see also Wall St. J., May 13, 1986, at 3, col. 1. Bernard Meier, a Swiss resident, who acted as 
broker for Levine's trades from 1982 to 1985, was also named as defendant. Meier was a 
portfolio manager and assistant vice president at Nassau based Bank Leu Internation Ltd., 
a subsidiary of the Swiss Bank Leu. Id. at 22, col. 1. 
20. Id. In all 54 cases, Levine traded while possessing "material non-public informa-
tion" about actual or proposed tender offers, mergers, leveraged buyouts and other business 
combinations. Id. at 3, col. 1. 
21. Henry, Dark Clouds Over Wall Street, TIME, May 26, 1986, at 48. 
22. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
23. Henry, supra note 21, at 48. Levine conducted his trades through Bernard Meier, 
an executive for the Bahamas subsidiary of Bank Leu, a Switzerland institution with head-
quarters in Zurich, Switzerland. Levine would purchase stocks in the name of two "dummy 
corporations" set up in Panama, "International Gold Inc." and "Diamond Holdings S.A." 
Id. 
24. Henry, supra note 19, at 61. 
25. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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the Bahamian attorney general agreed not to prosecute the bank 
for disclosing information.26 Although there is not a U.S.-Baha-
mian treaty which would allow SEC access to bank records, coop-
eration was given in this situation where bank secrecy had been 
used to promote fraud. 27 
As of June 5, 1986, Levine was permanently enjoined from fu-
ture violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.28 Pur-
suant to an order of the court, Levine is barred from association 
with any broker, dealer, investment adviser, investment company, 
or municipal securities dealer.29 Levine was ordered to "disgorge" 
all the money he had deposited in the Bahamas bank, approxi-
mately $10.6 million, and $1 million of additional assets.30 Levine 
also agreed to cooperate fully with the SEC's investigation of the 
matter, and any other related litigation that arose.31 Further sen-
tencing of Levine is expected. 
Evident in the Levine case, foreign bank secrecy could have a 
stifling impact on the prosecution of inside traders. Important in 
the disposition of that case was the cooperation of the Bahamian 
Government. 32 Where such cooperation is not given, an alternative 
is the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law. This alter-
native, however, often proves difficult. 
III. PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND FOR-
EIGN BANK SECRECY 
A. FOREIGN BANK SECRECY 
According to SEC officials, incidents of securities law viola-
tions vary proportionally to the size and activity of the securities 
market.33 From 1978 to 1983, total foreign investment in the 
26. Penn, Bahamas Official Suggests He May Waive Bank Secrecy Laws Again in In-
sider Cases, Wall St. J., May 28, 1986, at 12, col. 1. Paul Adderley, attorney general of the 
Bahamas waived the bank secrecy laws in the Levine case. 
27. Id. As was stated by Adderly, "you can't go to a bank in the Bahamas and try to 
invoke bank secrecy to hide dishonesty, the [law] was never intended to do that." Id. 
28. SEC v. Levine, (1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 92,761, at 
93,703 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
29. Id. at 93,703-04. 
30. Id. at 93,703. 
31. Id. 
32. See Penn, supra note 26, at 12, col. 1. 
33. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATISTICS ON SEC ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: REP. TO THE 
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COM. 3 
(1985). 
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United States had increased from $42.4 billion to $133.5 billion.34 
This increase in investment has led to increased complexity in en-
forcement and difficulty in conducting securities law violation 
investigations. 36 
Accompanying this rise in foreign investment, is a correspond-
ing increase in the number of securities transactions initiated by 
financial institutions located in countries with secrecy laws. 36 Bank 
secrecy laws protect the confidentiality of information held by the 
financial institution. 37 Banks operating within these countries are 
subject to civil liability and criminal prosecutions if they turn their 
records over to U.S. enforcement officials. 38 These laws protect the 
bank customer's identity, business records, and other details relat-
ing to the customer's bank account. 39 There are approximately 20 
nations that maintain some form of statutory bank secrecy, while 
still more are based on common law and other rationales. 40 
34. Id. at 44, app. 8. 
35. Id. 
36. Note, supra note 1, at 819. It has been estimated that 100 percent of foreign 
purchases of stocks and bonds in U.S. markets in 1983 were conducted by institutions which 
are protected by secrecy or blocking laws. Id. (citing Editorial, A Question of Conduct, Wall 
St. J ., Nov. 19, 1984, at 32, col. 1). 
40. 
37. Id. 
38. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2; see infra note 
39. Note, supra note 1, at 819. 
40. Id. at 821; see, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 333, n.3: 
The Bahamas Islands, An Act to Regulate Banking Business and Trust Companies 
within the Colony. No. 64 of 1965, assented to October 28, 1965: 
10. (1) Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise of his 
functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by any court of compe-
tent jurisdction within the Colony or under the provisions of any law of the Colony, 
no person shall disclose any information relating to any application by any person 
under the provisions of this Act or to the affairs of a licensee or of any customer of a 
licensee which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of 
his functions under this Act. 
(2) Every person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) of this section 
shall be guilty of an offence against this act and shall be liable on summary convic-
tion to a fine not exceeding one thousand pounds or to a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding one year or to both such fine and imprisonment; 
The Cayman Islands, The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (Law 16 of 
1976), September 27, 1976 as amended October 2, 1979: 
4b. [Whoever] wilfully obtains or attempts to obtain confidential information to 
which he is not entitled is guilty of an offense and liable on summary conviction to 
a fine not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or 
both. 
Article 47(b) of the Swiss Banking Act: 
1. Anyone who in his capacity as an officer or employee of a bank, or as an auditor 
or his employee, or as a member of the banking commission or as an officer or em-
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Nations with secrecy laws generally view confidentiality as a 
fundamental right. 41 Protections under bank secrecy laws have 
been compared to the attorney-client privilege in the United 
States, because "[b]oth restrict discovery of information in order 
that principles perceived as more fundamental [might be] up-
held. "42 Despite strict adherence to underlying principles of se-
crecy, a secrecy jurisdiction will generally permit disclosure if a 
customer waives his right to the confidentiality protections. 43 Ex-
traterritorial problems arise when secrecy jurisdictions have differ-
ent economic values and apply their own laws to the financial is-
sues that arise."" As noted by top government officials, the United 
States assessed need to reach persons transacting through foreign 
nations often runs counter to foreign interests and principles of 
sovereignty. 46 
As a result of secrecy laws, the SEC has encountered serious 
difficulties in obtaining information during investigations of cases 
pertaining to inside trading. 46 The use of secrecy laws to hide vio-
lations of U.S. laws has created a de facto double standard for en-
forcement of securities regulations. 47 One standard exists for those 
Id. 
ployee of its bureau intentionally violates his duty to observe silence or his profes-
sional rule of secrecy or anyone who induces or attempts to induce a person to com-
mit any such offense, shall be liable to a fine of up to 50,000 francs or imprisonment 
for up to six months, or both. 
2. If the offender acted with negligence, he shall be liable to a fine of up to 30,000 
francs. 
3. The violation of professional secrecy is also punishable after the termination of 
the official or contractual relationship or · of the professional performance. 
4. The federal or cantonal dispositions on the obligation to testify or to provide an 
authority with information remain reserved. 
Additionally, Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code prohibits the disclosure to a for-
eign authority or foreign private person of information of an economic nature if 
there is a direct interest of Switzerland as a political or economic entity to keep this 
information secret, or if third persons, having an interest worth being protected in 
keeping the information secret, have not duly given in advance their consent to the 
disclosure. 
41. Id. 
42. Note, supra note 1, at 821. 
43. Id. 
44. Note, supra note 6, at 497. 
45. See Address by Secretary Schultz, before the South Carolina Bar Association, Co-
lumbia, South Carolina (May 5, 1984) (published in 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 33 (1984)). In his 
address, Schultz noted "our assessment of our need to reach persons or property abroad 
often run up against other nations' conceptions of their sovereignty and interests and, if not 
handled skillfully and sensitively, can escalate into legal and political disputes." 
46. See, e.g., infra notes 95 & 116. 
47. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 318 (statement of John M. Fedders). 
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trading within the United States, and a lesser standard exists for 
those trading within the United States but from beyond U.S. bor-
ders.48 If persons engaging in fraudulent activity had done so en-
tirely within the United States, the SEC would be able to investi-
gate and hold them accountable for violating domestic securities 
laws. 49 A major goal of the SEC is to eradicate this de facto double 
standard. 50 An ability to circumvent the protective nature of se-
crecy jurisdictions is the first step. 
B. EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Foreign bank secrecy statutes have long been regarded as a 
serious hindrance to enforcement of U.S. securities laws.51 At issue 
is the sovereignty of the United States and the SEC's ability · to 
preserve the integrity of the U.S. security markets.52 Where secrecy 
laws are used to infringe upon U.S. sovereignty, they effectively 
invade the territory of the United States.53 This basic problem be-
comes acute when attempting to prosecute the inside trader 
through extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law. 
Before a secrecy jurisdiction may be compelled to honor an 
SEC request for information, some basis for jurisdiction must be 
established.54 Under international law, the jurisdiction of a state 
depends upon its interests in exercising jurisdiction in light of the 
competing interest of other states. 55 In examining competing inter-
ests, the state's interest is balanced against the transaction or 
48. Id. 
49. Under the Bank Secrecy Act, the SEC would possess information needed to prose-
cute fraudulent dealings. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
50. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 318 (statement of John M. Fedders). 
51. Id. at 320; see also H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. 
CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4394, 4397. "As note[d] by Congress in 1970: Secret foreign 
bank accounts and secret foreign financial institutions have permitted a proliferation of 
"white collar" crime ... [and] have allowed Americans and others to avoid the laws and 
regulations concerning securities and exchanges .. .. The debilitating effects of the use of 
these secret institutions on Americans and on the American economy are vast." Id. 
52. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 321 (statement of John M. Fedders). 
53. Id. 
54. Note, Offshore Funds and Rule IOb-5: An International Law Approach to Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 8 FORDHAM INT'L L. J . 
396, 401 (1985) [hereinafter Offshore Funds]; see also Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
and the Federal Money Laundering Offense, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 389, 398-406 (1986) [here-
inafter Extraterritorial Jurisdiction]. International law recognizes three fundamental bases 
of jurisdiction, those based on (1) territory, (2) nationality, (3) the effects doctrine. Id. (cit-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 17 (1965)). 
55. Offshore Funds, supra note 54, at 402. 
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event in question, the person to be affected, 56 the state's interest in 
protecting itself against actions executed outside its territory that 
threaten its existence, and certain universally condemned activi-
ties. 57 In determining jurisdiction over these securities transac-
tions, these factors are balanced with others in accordance with the 
reasonableness of a given country's assertion of jurisdiction over 
the matter.58 Extraterritorial problems become especially apparent 
when foreign secrecy jurisdictions subjectively consider their se-
crecy requirements more important than U.S. inside trading 
prohibitions.59 Without foreign consent to U.S. jurisdiction, cir-
cumvention of foreign secrecy laws is unlikely.60 
One country traditionally recognized for secrecy protections is 
Switzerland.61 In an attempt to limit problems of extraterritorial 
application of U.S. securities law, the U.S. Government negotiated 
various agreements with Switzerland which ultimately provided for 
a mechanism to access information. 62 Examination of the Switzer-
land situation is illustrative of the general foreign bank secrecy 
problem. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 404. 
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2) (rev. tent. draft No. 1-3, 
1980-1982). As stated in the Restatement: 
Id. 
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluating all rele-
vant factors, including: (a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the 
regulating state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the 
regulating state; (b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, 
between the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity 
to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is 
designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance 
of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such 
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally 
accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt 
by the regulation in question; (e) the importance of regulation to the international 
political, legal or economic system; (f) the extent to which such regulation is consis-
tent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another 
state may have an interest in regulating the activity; (h) the likelihood of conflict 
with regulation by other states. 
59. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
60. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 54, at 404-10. Traditionally three types of 
jurisdiction are distinguished: executive, judicial, and legislative. Executive and judicial ju-
risdictions both are sometimes referred to as "enforcement jurisdictions" this term generally 
means the ability of a state under international law to enforce a rule of law. As a general 
rule, a state may not exercise its enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of another state 
without the permission or consent of the other state. Id. 
61. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
62. See, e.g., Memorandum, supra note 14. 
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IV. THE SWISS EXAMPLE 
Switzerland originally codified the secrecy requirement for 
banking affairs in the Banking Law of 1934. 63 The Swiss action was 
in response to Nazi persecution of German Jews and others who 
held private assets in Swiss banks in violation of German law.64 
Swiss banks have traditionally played the financial intermediary 
role for clients by acting as stockbroker, underwriters, and mutual 
fund managers. 66 The Swiss bank has acted in these roles through 
"omnibus accounts" registered in the name of the bank only.66 
Swiss bank secrecy has effectively concealed the identity of the 
real party whose interest is put forth by the bank.67 
Several attempts were made by the U.S. enforcement and legal 
bodies to pierce the Swiss secrecy wall.68 These attempts finally 
resulted in the United States and Swiss Memorandum of Under-
standing on Inside Trading.69 The memorandum, although a mile-
stone, by no means makes the acquisition of information easy. 
There are several reviewing steps through which an information re-
quest by the United States Department of Justice or SEC must 
pass.70 Even if the request passes all the steps, the bank customer 
is first notified and allowed to defend his position to the Swiss au-
thorities. 71 If the Swiss authorities are satisfied that no inside trad-
ing has taken place, then no information passes to the U.S. author-
63. Federal Law Relating to Banks and Savings Institutions of Nov. 8, 1934, as 
amended by Federal Law of Mar. 11, 1971. The law was intended to protect investors by 
instituting various regulations on banking activities. See Note, supra note 4, at 608. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 611. 
66. Id. at 612. 
67. Id.; see Note, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6 TEX. INT'L L. J. 107, 121-22 (1970). 
These omnibus accounts are typically only identifiable by a number. Only a few top bank 
officials can connect the numbered account with the name of the owner. When a person 
receives a numbered account his signature either becomes his number written in long hand 
or a false name assigned to him. As a further example of their intent to protect secrecy, 
special carriers and "networks of semiclandestine agents" are used by some banks to deliver 
correspondence, thus avoiding the attention a Swiss postage stamp might bring. Even when 
the person deals personally with the bank his anonymity is frequently assured through the 
use of secret entrances, and private soundproof conference rooms. Id. 
68. See S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italians, 
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1116 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-
5322 (1982)), 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1986); Treaty for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 
May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.l.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into 
force Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter Swiss Treaty]. 
69. Memorandum, supra note 14. 
70. Note, supra note 4, at 626-28. 
71. Id. at 627. 
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ities. 72 Only if the Swiss authorities are not satisfied with the 
customer's explanation are records then turned over.73 
As cumbersome as the process seems,74 the memorandum gives 
U.S. enforcement officials a means to prosecute inside traders. 76 
Due to the U.S.-Switzerland agreement, inside traders have been 
reluctant to use Swiss banks and have looked to other secrecy na-
tions. 76 Agreements similar to that with Switzerland generally do 
not exist with other secrecy havens. Consequently, U. S. enforce-
ment authorities have, where necessary, used alternative methods 
of obtaining disclosure. 
V. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF OBTAINING 
DISCLOSURE 
A. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES LAW 
One of the first U.S. legislative efforts to combat the use of 
foreign bank accounts was the Bank Secrecy Act(BSA)77 passed by 
Congress in 1970. The act applies only to American citizens and 
those doing business in the United States.78 The act requires banks 
and other financial institutions79 to maintain extensive records80 
and file reports81 with the Secretary of the Treasury concerning 
certain domestic security transactions. 82 Failure to file the report, 
filing of a false or misleading report, or wilful violation of the act 
and its regulations can result in both civil and criminal penalties 
for the violator.83 
Although the BSA has been helpful to some government en-
forcement agencies, 84 its use in hampering unlawful securities 
72. Id. at 628. 
73. Id. 
74. See Note, supra note 4, at 626-28; see, e.g., infra note 95. 
75. See supra note 74. 
76. Note, supra note 4, at 623-24. Some countries with strict secrecy laws have been 
overly eager to shield acccounts from foreign investigations. One example is the Bahamas, 
which offered tighter secrecy after the Swiss eased their protections. As a result, Bahamian 
financial institutions subsequently experienced great growth in their trustee business. Id. 
77. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1982); see also 31 C.F.R. pt. 103 (1986); Note, Foreign 
Bank Secrecy and the Evasion of United States Securities Laws, 9 INT'L L. & PoL. 417, 432 
(1977). 
78. Note, supra note 77, at 432. 
79. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.ll(a)-(c),(e),(g)-(i) (1986). 
80. See id. § 103.31-.37. 
81. See id. § 103.21-.26. 
82. See id. § 103.22(a). 
83. See generally id. § 103.47-.49. 
84. Note, supra note 77, at 435. 
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transactions conducted through foreign financial institutions in se-
crecy jurisdictions has not been as fruitful. 85 Ineffectiveness results 
from its character of voluntary disclosure of information. Effective 
enforcement is possible only in jurisdictions where U.S. Govern-
ment agencies have access to records.86 Since U.S. officials are una-
ble to obtain information in those nations where bank secrecy laws 
are maintained, violations of the act are difficult to establish or 
prosecute. 87 
In addition to use of the BSA, U.S. authorities have sought 
disclosure of information through extraterritorial application of 
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193488 and Rule 
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP Rule 37).89 Rule 
lOb-5, which was enacted to enable prosecution of fraudulent deal-
ings in the U.S. securities exchange,90 is also applicable to foreign 
banks who transact business in U.S. markets.91 When information 
concerning the transaction is requested pursuant to Rule lOb-5, 
the foreign bank avoids compliance where the acts of disclosure 
might subject them to criminal liability in their own country.92 Un-
able to obtain the requested information, the SEC will seek a court 
order compelling discovery under FRCP Rule 37. 93 Under such cir-
cumstances, a court must balance the interests at stake. 94 In SEC 
v. Banca della Svizzera Italina (St. Joe's)85 the Southern District 
Court of New York applied such an approach: 
In St. Joe's, prior to the announcement of a take-over bid for 
St. Joe Minerals Corporation, there were various large transactions 
in their common stock. 96 The Swiss bank involved in the transac-
tions refused to provide needed information, and the SEC filed a 
motion to compel production of the requested information. 97 The 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 435-36. 
87. Id. at 436. 
88. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1986) (promulgated under the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1983)). 
89. FED. R. C1v. P. 37. 
90. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5. 
91. See SEC v. Banca della Suizzera, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ii 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (St. Joe's) (where jurisdiction over the foreign 
bank was based on its doing business in the United States). 
92. Id. 
93. See id; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 37. 
94. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
95. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
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Federal District Court granted the SEC's motion and ordered the 
bank to disclose the customers' identities or suffer substantial 
sanctions. 98 
Employing the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law,99 the 
district court balanced the vital national interests at stake, the 
hardship which would be imposed by the decision, and the good 
faith of the parties.100 The court concluded that "[i]t would be a 
travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to invade American 
markets, violate American laws ... withdraw profits and resist ac-
countability for itself and its principals . . . by claiming their ano-
nymity under foreign law."101 With a balancing decision favoring 
U.S. interests, 102 the bank obtained a waiver from its customer and 
produced the requested information.103 Unfortunately the success 
of this action is not indicative of all such cases where courts are 
often hesitant to apply only U.S. law.104 
B. TREATIES OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE 
Id. 
49. 
In addition to the Swiss and U.S. Memorandum of Under-
98. Id. at 92,149. 
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965), provides: 
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction, 
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the 
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, 
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the 
exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as: (a) vital na-
tional interests of each of the states, (b) the extent and the nature of the hardship 
that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person, (c) the extent 
to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state, (d) 
the nationality of the persons, and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of 
either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule pre-
scribed by that state. 
100. St. Joes, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,346, at 92,148-
101. Id. at 92,149. 
102. Id. 
103. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 324 (statement of John M. Fedders). 
104. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1971). The Supreme Court, in 
reviewing the ability of the United States to gain jurisdiction in a trade dispute contrary to 
a forum-selection clause (choosing the London Court of Justice as the forum for dispute 
resolution) in the trade contract, stated: 
Id. 
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if ... 
we insist on a parochial concept that all dispute must be resolved under our laws 
and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and 
international waters exclusively in our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in 
our courts. 
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standing, other negotiated solutions exist. 10~ Recently the United 
States and Cayman Islands signed a mutual legal assistance treaty, 
the result of three years of negotiations. 106 This is the first such 
treaty signed with a Caribbean island, an area traditionally known 
for its secrecy jurisdictions.107 The treaty anticipates mutual assis-
tance in the investigation and prosecution of acts that are criminal 
offenses in both countries. 108 Despite advantages gained by both 
countries, some have stated that the treaty was a result of coercive 
fines imposed by the United States.109 Similar treaties are cur-
rently in negotiation with other Caribbean islands110 and are also 
expected to be concluded. 
The crimes covered under the Cayman Islands Treaty are ex-
tensive.m Not only viewed as a positive step in the Caribbean for 
the United States, Cayman Islands officials also view this as a ben-
efit.112 Under the terms of the agreement, United States and Cay-
man Islands officials will cooperate in providing bank, business and 
government records; the taking of testimony and deposing of wit-
nesses; searches and seizures of evidence; and the transferring of 
individuals into custody.113 In recognizing that criminal activity re-
sults in international repercussions, countries with bank secrecy 
laws have been willing to cooperate where their best interests are 
105. See infra note 106. 
106. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2; see Treaty 
Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, June, 1986, United States-United 
Kingdom of Great Britain-Northern Ireland, reprinted in_ I.L.M. _ (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Cayman Islands Treaty] . The treaty is to be ratified by early 1987. See also Pasztor & 
Nazovio, U.S. Will Gain Access to Bank Records on Cayman Islands Under New Treaty, 
Wall St. J., July 3, 1986, at 5. 
107. See U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col 2; see, e.g., 
TAX HAVEN INFORMATION BooK, supra note 15. This list shows the relative number of Car-
ribean Islands involved compared to other areas. 
108. See supra note 106. 
109. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2. The treaty was 
signed after a U.S. court began imposing huge fines on the U.S. branches of banks whose 
affiliate operations in the Cayman islands had refused to cooperate with U.S. investigators. 
Id. 
110. Id. Stephen S. Troth, head of the Justice Department Criminal Division, has indi-
cated that similar agreements with Jamaica, and Turks and Caicos Islands, the Virgin Is-
lands and Bahamas will be reached. Id. 
111. Pasztor & Nazovio, supra note 106, at 5. A senior Justice Department official 
stated "the crimes covered by the treaty are nearly all encompassing, and it will greatly help 
prosecutors gather evidence in many more cases". Id. 
112. Id. Peter Tomkins, president of the Cayman Islands Bankers Association stated, 
"[t]his agreement may frighten some people away [from doing business in the islands], but 
probably those are the people we want to frighten away." Id. 
113. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2; see Cayman 
Islands Treaty, supra note 106, art. I. 
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also served. m Though a sign of cooperation, treaties often prove to 
be an unwielding and frustrating means of prosecution for the 
SEC.116 
A classic example of the inefficiency of using treaties as prose-
cution tools is the case of SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchaser 
(Santa Fe ).116 In Santa Fe, there were various transactions in the 
common stock of the Santa Fe International Corporation, immedi-
ately prior to the public announcement of their merger with the 
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.117 Various Swiss banks purchased 
the securities on behalf of their undisclosed customers and subse-
quently refused to divulge their names.118 
The SEC request for information was first made in early 1982, 
under the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters be-
tween the United States and Switzerland.119 The request was de-
nied by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in early 1983.120 The SEC con-
tinued to litigate the case, and based on additional information 
again filed a request for assistance on July 27, 1983.121 The request 
was granted by the Swiss Tribunal on May 26, 1984, 122 and the 
SEC was given the names of the unknown purchasers.123 The Tri-
bunal's decision was then appealed to several political bodies with 
jurisdiction over the matter, and the SEC was prevented from ob-
taining further documentary evidence with respect to the purchas-
ers.124 Finally on February 20, 1985, almost three years after their 
initial request, the SEC announced that the Swiss Federal Council 
had cleared the way for their long sought after documents and tes-
timony .125 This case illustrates the burdensome process that inhib-
its the SEC in its acquisition of necessary information through ne-
114. U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2. Stephen S. 
Troth, head of the Justice Department Criminal Division, stated, "[a]ll crime has taken on 
an international dimension and I think these countries realize it is in their best interest to 
discourage it within their borders". Id. 
115. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text. 
116. SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ii 91,951, at 90,750 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Santa Fe). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 90,751. The request was initially filed with the Swiss banks on March 22, 
1982. Id. 
119. Id.; see Swiss Treaty, supra note 68. 
120. Santa Fe , [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,951, at 
90,751. The request was denied on January 26, 1983. 
121. Id. at 90,751. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. The Swiss Federal Council was the last body with jurisdiction over the matter. 
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gotiated treaties. 
Although methods of disclosure exist, they are often lengthy126 
and not uniformly applied.127 Something must be done to over-
come problems in obtaining disclosure. Cases like that of Dennis 
Levine serve to destroy our "vital national interest in maintaining 
the integrity of the securities markets."128 Much more is at stake 
than the $12.6 million hidden by Levine,129 the entire future of the 
securities exchange is at issue.130 
VI. A NEEDED UNIFORM APPROACH 
A. FURTHER TREATIES OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE 
One possible solution is continued negotiation of treaties with 
secrecy jurisdictions. Treaties such as that recently executed with 
the Cayman Islands,131 allow for mutual assistance and a fairly ef-
fective route for U.S. authorities to gather information on inside 
traders. 132 Foreign secrecy laws should not be given extraterritorial 
effect to circumvent investigations of transactions that occur in the 
United States.133 Foreign nations should recognize that it is the ac-
count holder's choice to engage in conduct within the United 
States and outside the jurisdiction of the secrecy country.134 Se-
crecy jurisdictions and those who trade through them, must under-
stand that the act of trading securities outside the territory of the 
secrecy jurisdiction constitutes a waiver of any applicable secrecy 
provisions. 136 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a defendant will be 
found to have submitted to the jurisdiction of a state when the 
defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the foreign state, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws."136 By conducting a securities transaction in 
the United States, a foreign financial institution and its customers 
126. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. 
127. See supra notes 101, 104 and accompanying text. 
128. See SEC v. Banca della Suizzera, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (St. Joe's). 
129. See supra note 21. 
130. See infra notes 17 5, 178-79 and accompanying text. 
131. See Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 106. 
132. See generally id. 
133. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 322 (statement of John M. Fedders). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 321 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213-16 (1977); Hanson v. 
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957)). 
15
Psutka: Dennis Levine, an exception or the Norm: Inside Trading and Forei
Published by SURFACE, 1987
104 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 14:89 
deliberately avail themselves of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties here, and "invoke the benefits and protection" of the U.S. se-
curities markets and of U.S. law.137 It seems they should also ac-
cept the responsibilities associated with the exercise of this 
privilege. 138 
The use of negotiated treaties appears consistent with the 
principle of international comity.139 It extends due respect to the 
sovereignty and laws of nations with secrecy statutes, 140 but also 
provides a basis for vindicating the sovereignty of the United 
States and the integrity of its security markets.141 The basic deter-
rent to a continuance of this approach is the sometimes cumber-
some procedure encountered in obtaining information. 
B. CFTC AND A PRETRADING DISCLOSURE SYSTEM 
The best solution is a pretrading disclosure system, whereby 
any foreign institution trading in the U.S. securities market must 
agree to divulge requested information prior to trading. Failure to 
comply with these preexecution provisions would result in the dis-
allowance of further financing in U.S. markets. To best explain, it 
is helpful to examine an analogous program presently employed by 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).142 
The CFTC conditions access to the U.S. futures markets upon 
a willingness to provide information prior to trade execution, in 
response to a specific request of the CFTC.143 The rules require 
that futures commission merchants provide the name, address and 
certain information concerning the holder, or beneficial holder of 
an open futures contract in response to such a special request and 
on the account's first day of trading.144 The CFTC's special call 
provisions avoid many of the problems inherent in effective service 
of process upon a resident of another country, such as a bank in a 
secrecy jurisdiction. 145 Examining an attempted inside trader pros-
137. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 321 (statement of John M. Fedders); see supra 
note 136. 
138. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 321 (statement of John M. Fedders). 
139. Id. at 322; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1972). Under the doc-
trine of comity, a state is asked to honor a judgment of a foreign country. Comity is not a 
rule of law, but one of practical convenience and courtesy. Id. 
140. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 322 (statement of John M. Fedders). 
141. Id. 
142. See infra notes 156-69 and accompanying text. 
143. See infra notes 158-61, 167-68 and accompanying text. 
144. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 17.0l(b)(1)(2)(4), 21.03(c)(l) (1986). 
145. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 322 (statement of John M. Fedders). 
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ecution would provide the best means of illustrating the benefits of 
adopting a system similar to that utilized presently by the com-
modities futures exchange. 
Utilizing methods presently available,146 upon suspecting in-
side trading activity, the SEC would attempt to trace the source of 
the transaction. If the trade were found to have been executed 
through a foreign bank for an anonymous account, a requested dis-
closure of the account holder would likely occur. 147 Assuming the 
customer refused to consent to the bank's disclosure, the bank 
would not reveal the account's holder, pursuant to the jurisdic-
tion's secrecy laws.148 At this point, the SEC would make an at-
tempt to exercise jurisdiction over the matter149 and extraterritori-
ally apply the requirements of U.S. securities law.160 A probable 
stalemate would result when U.S. law runs counter to the basis of 
foreign secrecy laws. 161 Even if a treaty existed based on mutual 
assistance, 162 expedience in the prosecution of the inside trader is 
not likely. 163 
If a system similar to that employed by the CFTC were 
adopted by the SEC, necessary information would generally be 
available to enforcement authorities at the time of the suspected 
violation. 164 On the initial day of trading for any new account, the 
bank in a secrecy jurisdiction, acting as a "foreign broker"166 for an 
anonymous account, must file a report with the SEC.166 Before 
trading could occur, the bank would have to inform the account 
holder of specific requirements under any applicable provisions.167 
146. See, e.g., supra notes 14, 77, 88, 89 & 106. 
147. See, e.g., SEC v. Banca della Suizzera, (1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,346, at 92,144 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (St . Joe's). 
148. See U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, supra note 14, at DlO, col. 2. If the bank 
makes an unauthorized disclosure, civil and criminal liability can attach. See also supra 
note 40. 
149. See generally supra note 54. 
150. Id. 
151. See, e.g., St. Joe's, (1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,346, 
at 92,144. Prior to the SEC's request for an applicaiton of FRCP Rule 37, the SEC had 
failed in their attempted application of Rule lOb-5. 
152. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 1; Cayman Islands Treaty, supra note 106. 
153. See generally SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers, (1984-1985 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 91,951, at 90,750 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Santa Fe). 
154. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text. 
155. 17 C.F.R. § 15.00(a)(l) (1986) . "Foreign broker" means any person located outside 
the United States or its territories who carries an account in commodity futures ... for any 
other person. Id. 
156. See id. § 15.0l(b). 
157. See id. § 15.05(c). 
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When reported for the first time, the foreign broker would provide 
the name and address of the account holder,168 the number as-
signed to the account, 169 and the business or occupation of the ac-
count holder, 160 among other information. 161 The account for which 
the bank was trading would have a "unique designator,"162 through 
which the SEC could identify the account and maintain all the 
necessary information.163 Without the foreign broker's knowledge 
of these requirements, it would be unlawful to enter into any 
transactions.164 Besides initial requirements, the bank would be re-
quired to submit a report of the daily activities, such as the quan-
tities in each security traded, for each business day the account 
traded.166 
If upon examining trading activity, a particular day's trading 
appeared suspicious, the SEC could make a "special call" for fur-
ther information on an account of a foreign broker.166 The foreign 
broker (bank) must then provide the SEC with the specified infor-
mation.167 If the SEC was unsatisfied with the response, or the se-
crecy bank failed to respond at all, the Commission would be em-
powered to prohibit the execution of further trades for that 
account. 168 If the foreign bank or account holder felt they were 
treated unfairly, they would have the option of requesting a hear-
158. Id. § 17.0l(b)(l). 
159. Id. § 17.0l(b)(2). 
160. Id. § 17.0l(b)(4). 
161. See generally id. 
162. See infra note 163. 
163. 17 C.F.R. § 17.0l(a). "For the purpose of reporting futures information ... each 
... foreign broker shall assign a unique designator to each special account and shall report 
such account only by such designator ... [T]he designator used shall be numeric ... [and] 
shall not be changed or assigned to another account without prior approval of the Comis-
sion." Id. 
164. Id. § 15.05(c). "It shall be unlawful for any futures commission merchant ... to 
open a futures . . . account . . . or cause to be affected transaction . . . unless the futures 
commission merchant . . . informs the foreign broker prior thereto, . . . the requirements of 
this section." Id. § 21.03(b). 
165. Id. § 17.00(a). 
166. Id. § 21.03(c). "Upon a determination by the Commission that information con-
cerning accounts may be relevant information in enabling the Commission to determine 
whether the threat of a market manipulation, ... or other market disorder exists ... the 
Commission may issue a call for information from a futures commission merchant or cus-
tomer .... " Id. 
167. Id. § 21.03(e). For information that may be specifically requested, see id. § 
21.03( c)( l)(i)-( v ). 
168. Id. § 21.03(f). "If the Commission has reason to believe that a futures commission 
merchant or customer has not responded as required to a call ... the Commission in writing 
may ... prohibit the execution of ... trades on . .. the behalf of the futures commission 
merchant or customer named in the call ... . "Id. 
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ing at which point evidence could be offered to show the inappro-
priateness of the SEC's request.169 
Under a system similar to the CFTC's, the SEC would have 
the information concerning an account in a secrecy jurisdiction on 
the initial day of trading and on every day the account was ac-
tive. 170 Before trading could occur, the account holder would be 
notified of all requirements that would need to be met.171 Upon 
suspecting fraudulent activity, the SEC would possess a mecha-
nism through which it could acquire further information.172 If such 
information was not obtained, the SEC could prevent further trad-
ing for that account.173 Extraterritorial concerns would essentially 
be eliminated. Any account which desired to trade in U.S. security 
markets through a financial institution in a secrecy jurisdiction 
would have to disclose its true beneficiary on the first day trading 
occurred or forego trading at all.174 
Under the present system of SEC inside trading disclosure 
and enforcement, the "integrity of the securities industry" is ques-
tionable.176 It was noted by the Chairman of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee that the securities industry was failing in its 
duties as the "first line of defense" against securities fraud.176 
Something must be done to boost the integrity of the U.S. securi-
ties markets. No system or mechanism employed by the SEC has 
yet proved effective in deterring the inside trader or in providing 
for speedy detection and prosecution after any fraudulent activity. 
A working system exists in the commodity futures market. The 
SEC should adopt a similar system which would both provide 
greater deterrence to the inside trader and easier access to in-
formation for the SEC. "Only (the SEC) can save (themselves) 
•• "
177 If the integrity of the securities industry is lost, then the 
169. Id. § 21.03(g). 
170. See supra notes 158-61, 165 and accompanying text. 
171. See 17 C.F.R. § 15.05(c). 
172. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
173. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra notes 158-61, 165 and accompanying text. 
175. Dingell is Unable to Heap Any Praise on Securities Sector, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 
1987, at 3. The Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Representative 
John Dingell in addressing the Securities Industry Association stated, "[t]his is not a speech 
in praise of the integrity of the securities industry, dismissing you to go off to cocktails ... 
[t]hat speech would be the equivalent of a father turning the keys of his shiny new Porsche 
over to a son who had over the last three weeks totalled the family wagon and RV, flunked 
two courses and broken curfew every other night." Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
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strength of the securities market faulters. 178 No one "want[s] to 
preside over a repeat of 1929."179 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Inside trading accounts for billions of dollars180 of lost funds. 
This problem is further augmented by the "insiders" use of finan-
cial institutions in bank secrecy jurisdictions. As apparent through 
examining the Dennis Levine case and information on recent for-
eign investment in U.S. markets, this problem appears to be inten-
sifying. Hampered by extraterritorial concerns, U.S. enforcement 
authorities require a means to circumvent the secrecy barriers. 
Attempts to break these barriers have been made and proved 
successful but burdensome in Switzerland and the Cayman Is-
lands. 181 Although many solutions have been proposed and tried, a 
uniform approach to the evasion of domestic securities laws must 
be formulated and adhered to universally. A pretrading disclosure 
requirement system has been tried and proven in the commodities 
future exchange. 182 SEC adoption of this approach could prove to 
be the only way that fraudulent securities transactions can be 
curtailed. 
Stephen J. Psutka 
178. See id. 
179. Id. 
180. See Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 320. 
181. See supra notes 14, 106 & 119-25 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra notes 155-69 and accompanying text. 
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